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Abstract. The introduction of smartcard technologies has reduced the incidence 
of card fraud in the UK, but there are still significant losses from fraudulent 
card use. In this paper we detail the context of smartcard introduction and de-
scribe the types of fraud that remain a threat to cardholders and other stake-
holders in the card system. We conclude with a risk analysis from the card-
holder’s perspective and recommend greater cardholder awareness of such 
risks. 
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1.   Introduction 
A recent report from the European Security Transport Association (ESTA) found that 
nearly 20% of the adult population in Great Britain has been targeted as part of a 
credit or debit card scam. As a result, the UK has been termed the ‘Card Fraud Capital 
of Europe’ [1], with UK citizens twice as likely to become victims of card fraud as 
other Europeans.  Plastic card fraud is a lucrative exploit for criminals and the pro-
ceeds may be used to fund organised crime.  Smart payment cards (Chip and PIN 
cards) were introduced in the UK to replace magnetic stripe cards and support PIN 
verification of card transactions. By the end of 2005, more than 107 million of the 
141.6 million cards in the UK had been upgraded to smart cards [2]. Levels of plastic 
card fraud fell by 13% to £439.4 million in 2005 [3] and again to £428 million in 
2006 (Figure 1).  The reduction has been widely attributed to the rollout of smart 
cards with Chip and PIN authentication. 
If the media is to be believed, the UK introduction of Chip and PIN authentication 
for credit and debit card transactions is flawed and has failed to reduce levels of card 
fraud across the board. Specific cases highlighting the security implications of smart 
card based technology have been widely reported, including exploits at Shell petrol 
stations [4] and Tesco self-service tills [5]. 
As cards are a widely accepted international form of payment, fraud can happen 
virtually anywhere in the world or on the Internet.  Cards can be compromised in the 
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UK and then used overseas.  Cardwatch research shows that most of the fraud com-
mitted abroad on UK cards affects cards that have been compromised in the UK [3].  
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Figure 1 - Trends in Plastic Card Fraud Levels [6]  
Although the financial cost of card fraud is largely borne by the banking industry, the 
cardholder experiences loss of time in taking steps to resolve matters, as well as in-
convenience, worry and frustration while a fraudulent incident is investigated.   The 
cardholder’s credit rating can be affected and the whole affair can be a distressing ex-
perience. Figure 2 shows that levels of international fraud have risen for UK issued 


















Figure 2 - Domestic and International Split of Fraud on UK Issued Debit and Credit 
Cards [6] 
2.   Types of Card Fraud 
The UK Payments Association (APACS) has identified five categories of card fraud: 
 
x Counterfeit Card Fraud, 
x Skimming,  
x Mail Non Receipt,  
x Lost and Stolen Fraud, 
x Card not Present. 
Levels of these frauds on UK issued cards are shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 - Levels of Plastic Card Fraud on UK Issued Cards 2004-2006 [6] 
2.1   Counterfeit Card Fraud  
Counterfeit cards are also referred to as cloned cards.  Counterfeit cards are made by 
altering and re-coding validly issued cards or by printing and encoding cards without 
permission from the card issuing company. Most cases of counterfeit fraud involve 
skimming of valid card details, a process whereby the genuine card details from the 
magnetic stripe are electronically copied onto another card, without the legitimate 
cardholder’s knowledge.  In most cases, the cardholder will be unaware that their card 
details have been skimmed until card statements reveal that illicit transactions have 
been made on their account. 
2.2   Skimming  
Skimming of card details can happen at retail outlets where a corrupt employee can 
put a card through a skimming device which will copy data from the card’s magnetic 
stripe so it can be used to encode a counterfeit card. Skimming can also occur at cash 
machines where a skimming device has been fitted.  A skimming device is attached to 
the card entry slot where it records the electronic details from the magnetic stripe on 

















the back of the inserted card.  A separate pin-hole camera is hidden to overlook the 
PIN entry pad to record the PIN number. Fraudsters can then produce a counterfeit 
card for use with the captured PIN to withdraw cash at a cash machine.   
Criminals can also shoulder surf, whereby they watch the user entering a PIN and 
then steal the card for their own use.  Another type of device can be inserted into a 
cash machine where it will trap the inserted card.  A fraudster can then suggest retry-
ing the PIN.  Once the genuine cardholder gives up and leaves to contact the card is-
suer or cash machine operator, the criminal can then remove device, retrieve the card 
and then use it with the PIN details they have observed. 
2.3   Lost and Stolen Fraud 
This type of fraud occurs when a card is lost by the cardholder or is stolen from them. 
Fraudsters can then use the card to obtain goods and services.  Once the cardholder 
notices their card is gone, they will contact the card issuer but as it can take time to 
realise the card has gone, most fraud of this type takes place before the card has been 
reported as lost or stolen.  
Levels of this type of fraud have remained static for the past five years but the in-
troduction of Chip and PIN is expected to reduce this by making it more difficult for 
fraudsters to use a lost or stolen card in person at a retail outlet.  Prior to Chip and 
PIN, the retailer would verify that the signature on the sales voucher matched that 
written on the back of the card.  The signature strip was signed by the cardholder in 
ink and was subject to wear and tear over the lifetime of the card. 
2.4   Mail Non-Receipt  
This occurs where a card is stolen when it is in transit from the issuing bank or build-
ing society to the cardholder.   This is similar to lost and stolen fraud since it takes 
time for the cardholder to realise that a card has not arrived. This delay is often com-
pounded by the fact that cards are often sent out automatically by the issuers rather 
than at request of the cardholder, e.g. when a card is nearing its expiry date.   Card is-
suers have endeavoured to reduce levels of this type of fraud by using secure mail 
services and/or requiring the cardholder to phone and activate the card before it can 
be used. However, fraudsters could still intercept cards in transit and skim the details 
before re-mailing them to the cardholder.  Once the cardholder activates the card, the 
fraudster can also use the counterfeit card produced using the skimmed details.   
Credit card cheques, often sent to cardholders on an unsolicited basis by the card 
issuing company, also offer criminals an additional means of obtaining unauthorised 
spending against a card account.   
2.5   Card Not Present 
This type of fraud covers any card transactions where the cardholder is not physically 
present, i.e. those conducted over the internet, telephone, fax and mail order, and is 
now the largest type of card fraud in the UK [6].  Fraudsters obtain details of a card, 
i.e. cardholder name, card number and the 3 digit security number from the back of 
the card, and can use these to pay for goods or services over the internet, phone, fax 
or mail order. Companies reliant on Card Not Present (CNP) transactions are unable 
to check the physical security features of the card to determine if it is genuine and 
cannot rely on signature or PIN authentication. Equally, there is no check that the in-
formation is being provided by the genuine cardholder. 
2.6   Card ID Theft 
Identity theft occurs when a criminal obtains an individual’s personal information and 
uses this to open or access card accounts in that individual’s name.   A criminal may 
use stolen documents such as utility bills and bank statements, or false documents, to 
give the necessary documentation to open up a card account.  Alternatively, they can 
use key bits of personal information to take control of an account, perhaps arranging 
for payments to be taken from the card account or by changing account address de-
tails and requesting issue of cheques or a new card.  
2.7   Likely Trends 
Wilhelm [7] considered the future of credit and debit card fraud due to the introduc-
tion of smart cards and predicted a hybrid period of approximately ten to fifteen years 
during which magnetic stripe and smart card technology would co-exist.  In this pe-
riod, fraudsters will get creative and exploit technology and social conditioning to de-
vise attacks on chip technology. 
One of the highlighted concerns is allowing the use of the magnetic stripe as a 
fallback where a chip fails to function. This permits fraudsters to circumvent a num-
ber of the safeguards provided by smart card technology. This will prevent Chip and 
PIN from fully addressing counterfeit card fraud made possible through the theft of 
card details in transit or from lost/stolen scenarios. While the report predicts that a 
significant reduction in card counterfeiting is likely to occur, it acknowledges that 
while magnetic stripes are available, counterfeiting remains a viable option for fraud-
sters.  The report also highlights that fraudsters will focus their efforts on CNP fraud 
and target merchants as a vulnerable link in the process.  
3.   Stakeholders 
Although cardholders are usually the focus of concern in matters of card fraud, there 
are other stakeholders in the establishment, use and maintenance of smartcards. These 
stakeholders are (1) cardholders; (2) merchants; (3) Acquirers; and each of these has 
roles, responsibilities and risks in operation of the card system.  
Research indicates that we can all do more to defeat criminals, particularly where 
basic security measures are involved.  Statistics, such as the following [8], are particu-
larly alarming and highlight the need for cardholders to be aware of the risk and im-
pact if they fail to protect their PIN number and card details: 
 x 25% of all UK residents have disclosed their PIN to someone else, exposing them 
to heightened risk of fraud and potentially making them liable for any card fraud 
losses they may suffer; 
x 27% of Britons use the same PIN for all their cards and the average adult has four 
cards each; 
x 44% of people still allow their cards out of their sight (in restaurants and bars for 
example) when settling a bill; 
x 51% of online shoppers do not fully appreciate that the start of a website address 
changes from ‘http’ to ‘https’ when they enter a website made secure for purchas-
ing. 
The key recommendation for cardholders is that they should be security conscious 
and take all practical precautions when undertaking a card payment.  Cardholder 
complacency is still a large factor in card fraud levels.  While card issuers are unlikely 
to acknowledge vulnerabilities, in order to avoid adverse reputational impacts, in-
creased cardholder awareness of the risks and impacts associated with known vulner-
abilities in the Chip and PIN system, will ensure that they become less complacent.   
The large variety of card terminals makes it difficult for a cardholder to identify 
one that has been tampered with, but there are other ways they can notice fraudulent 
actions, for example by being familiar with merchant best practices.  This would al-
low them to raise alarms with other staff members if suspicious behaviour is ob-
served, e.g., swiping a card prior to inserting it into a card terminal or watching a PIN 
being entered. Cardholders should also check their credit card and current account 
statements to identify any illicit transactions.  One measure to limit exposure for a 
debit card linked to a current account is to establish a second account containing a 
smaller balance for use in card transactions 
The agreements which merchants have with their acquirers spell out the terms un-
der which they can accept card payments.  The terminals supplied by the acquirers de-
termine floor limits and undertake the Chip and PIN authorisation process. Vulner-
abilities exist when fraudsters have access to terminals and so merchants should seek 
to address and improve staff awareness of process vulnerabilities that could lead to 
card fraud through training.  Staff should be trained in card transaction processes and 
be empowered to request additional authorisation via a Code 10 call where they deem 
necessary and know how to do this without putting themselves at risk. 
Merchants must also be alert to the fact that they are a prime target for fraudsters.  
They have a responsibility to be vigilant and monitor transactions and any suspicious 
staff activities.  References should be checked when hiring new staff.  Systems hold-
ing customer and transaction data must be adequately protected.  Any concerns raised 
by customers about staff undertaking card transactions should be investigated.  Card 
present merchants have various ways of reading and processing card details e.g. staff 
inserts card, cardholder inserts card or card is swiped and this can make it difficult for 
cardholders to know what would constitute a suspicious action by a member of staff.   
Acquirer guidelines should be followed to minimise the risk of chargeback for 
both card present and CNP transactions.  The planned rollout of ‘contactless’ cards in 
the UK towards the end of 2007 may introduce further concerns for merchants as only 
one in three low value transactions would be flagged for verification by PIN. For a 
CNP merchant there are specific challenges as Chip and PIN is not currently an op-
tion for this type of transaction and it is an area where card fraud has risen signifi-
cantly.   
The Address Verification System (AVS) allows retailers to verify the billing ad-
dress supplied with that associated with the cardholder and Card Security Code (CSC) 
allows retailers to cross check a special security code held on the back of the card. 
Card schemes are also introducing positive identification measures such as Verified 
by Visa and MasterCard Secure Code to help merchants.  Merchants should protect 
themselves against chargeback’s by introducing these measures for on-line transac-
tions.  By 30th June 2007, all CNP merchants must have introduced this measure or at 
least have a plan in place to do so.  Chargeback of disputed transactions is likely for 
any non-compliant merchants. 
The acquirer or merchant acquirer is the bank retained by the retailer to process 
payment card transactions on their behalf. Acquirers are responsible for paying the 
merchant for the transactions they process.  They do this on receipt of card transaction 
details from retailers by passing them to the card issuer for authorisation and process-
ing. Acquirers are also responsible for obtaining transaction authorisation prior to the 
delivery of goods and/or services. 
The responsibility for maintenance and upgrades to card terminals also lies with 
acquirers who risk who must provide clear instructions and guidelines to merchants in 
order to minimise instances of card fraud and chargeback. Acquirers are increasingly 
using fraud detection software to detect patterns that could be due to fraudulent activ-
ity.  This can be helpful in identifying and investigating unusual patterns of transac-
tions.  
4.   Risk Assessment  
Security is a balance between confidentiality, authentication and integrity versus con-
venience, cost and reliability. Figure 4 illustrates the balance that must be struck by 
stakeholders when implementing technical solutions to counter security vulnerabili-
ties, essentially this boils down to cost versus benefits.  
 
 
Figure 4 - Risk Management Payoffs [9] 
This generic approach can be applied to security measures for smart card payments, 
whereby:  
 
x Cost is the amount it costs the card issuer and card scheme to support the plastic 
card payments, including the cost of implementing changes to the system e.g. 
longer keys or moving to online authentication to validate all card transactions; 
x Performance considers convenience and reliability e.g. avoiding reputational 
damage or inconvenience for customers or retailers; 
x Risk is remaining level of risk which the security measures have not fully miti-
gated.  This could be financial loss, additional costs, loss of market share, reputa-
tional damage, corporate embarrassment, legal or regulatory investigation or risk 
to personal safety. 
The potential loss or exposure from a given risk can be reduced through assessing and 
management of the risk (Figure 5).  Effective risk reduction methods may leave an 
element of residual risk, but will bring benefits, although these may not always be fi-




Figure 5 - Risk Management 
A risk map is a technique to analyse and illustrate risks, likely causal events and po-
tential impacts [10].  The links shown are not always exhaustive but demonstrate the 
potentially wide ranging impacts of each risk and support analysis of outcomes and 
mitigation actions.  As a tool, they also allow flexibility to consider how the impact of 
one risk, e.g., card stolen, can be compounded by the occurrence of other risks, such 
as the PIN having been obtained.  
Figure 6 illustrates a risk map analysis for the cardholder, based upon four primary 
risk conditions, card obtained by fraudsters, card details obtained by fraudsters, PIN 
obtained by fraudsters, and PIN forgotten by cardholder. The associated cardholder 
events represent the contexts in which the risks are created, and the impact arising 
from these circumstances is also indicated.  
For the cardholder, the key risks centre on the components for which the card-
holder is responsible, namely the smartcard, the PIN and documents such as state-
ments and receipts that contain card details.  The events include some that are within 
the cardholder’s control, e.g., keeping a note of the PIN number, but others such as a 
compromised terminal are beyond cardholder control. 
Figure 6 - Risk Map for Cardholder 
5.   Summary and Conclusions 
The introduction of smartcards to the UK marketplace has had a significant effect in 
reducing the incidence of card fraud, but further steps are required to prevent contin-
ued instances of fraud. A key step in this direction is to clarify the roles, responsibili-
ties and risks faced by the different stakeholders in the card process. Furthermore, 
‘awareness raising’ in which cardholders become more conscious of their risks and 
responsibilities may afford the best defence against consumer fraud. Our analysis of 
the card process, stakeholders and cardholder risks may contribute to this awareness.  
C a rd  d e ta ils  o b ta in e d  
b y  fra u d s te rs
R is k E v e n t Im p a c t
P IN  is  fo rg o tte n
In te rn e t /  P h is h in g
P IN  is  o b ta in e d  b y  
fra u d s te rs
F in a n c ia l L o s s  fro m  
fra u d u le n t tra n s a c tio n s
M e rc h a n ts  b a c k  o ffic e  
s y s te m s  a re  
c o m p ro m is e d
F ra u d u le n t tra n s a c tio n s  ( fra u d  
a b ro a d /C N P )
N o  fu n d s  a v a ila b le  to  g e n u in e  
c a rh o ld e r
P e rs o n a l E m b a ra s s m e n t
B re a c h  o f c a rd  is s u e rs  te rm s  
a n d  c o n d itio n s
R is k  to  p e rs o n a l s a fe ty
C a rd  lo s t
P O S  T e rm in a l o r  A T M  
c o m p ro m is e d
C a rd  s ta te m e n ts  o r 
re c e ip ts  o b ta in e d
C a rd  s to le n
G e n u in e  c a rd  o b ta in e d  
b y  fra u d s te rs
O b v io u s  P IN  c h o s e n
P IN  w rit te n  d o w n
C o rru p t m e rc h a n t s ta ff
T o o  m a n y  to  re m e m b e r
R a re ly  u s e d
C a rd  c a n c e lle d /b lo c k e d
Id e n tity  th e ft
L e g a l im p lic a tio n s
C re d it  ra tin g  a ffe c te d
C a rd  c a n c e lle d  a n d  n e w  c a rd  
is s u e d .  U s e  a lte rn a tiv e s
F ra u d u le n t P IN  A u th o ris e d  
c a rd  tra n s a c tio n s
T im e  a n d  e ffo rt  re q u ire d  to  
re s o lv e
C a rd h o ld e r
References 
1. This Is Money. UK is ‘Card fraud capital’. 2006.  Available from: 
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/credit-and-
loans/idfraud/article.html?in_article_id=414834&in_page_id=159. Last accessed 
21/03/2008. 
2. APACS. Plastic Cards, 2006. Available from: 
http://www.apacs.org.uk/payment_options/plastic_cards.html. Last accessed 21/03/2008. 
3. Cardwatch. The cost of card fraud, 2006. Available from: 
http://www.cardwatch.org.uk/default.asp?sectionid=5&pageid=123. Last accessed 
21/03/2008. 
4.  BBC. Petrol firm suspends chip-and-pin, 2006. Available from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/4980190.stm. Last accessed 21/03/2008. 
5. BBC. Thieves 'cash in at Tesco tills', 2006. Available from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5406742.stm. Last accessed 21/03/2008. 
6. APACS. One year anniversary of Chip and PIN change over - UK leads the way in Chip 
and PIN rollout, 2007. Available from:. 
http://www.apacs.org.uk/media_centre/press/07_14_02.html?print=yes&print=yes. Last ac-
cessed 21/03/2008. 
7. Wilhelm, W, K. Payment Card Fraud in a Chip Card World – examining potential changes 
in card fraud in the near future, FairIsaac, March 2003. Available from: 
http://www.fairisaac.com/NR/rdonlyres/7CE35A4B-96B0-43A0-9503-
78BDAC483510/0/PaymentCardFraudWP.pdf. Last accessed 21/03/2008. 
8. RBS. Fraudwatch Newsletter, No 23, Royal Bank of Scotland, Dec 2006. 
9. McCumber. Assessing and Managing Security Risk in IT Systems.  Auerback Publications, 
CRC Press Florida, USA, 2005. 
10. Buchanan S. and Gibb, F. The information audit: methodology selection. International 
Journal of Information Management, 2008. 
